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The objective of this thesis is to investigate various factors that influence the job 
performance and promotion of DOD civilian workers. The data used in this study were 
drawn from the Department of Defense Civilian Personnel Data Files provided by the 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The initial data was restricted to employees 
who were initially hired in 1995 and stayed in service until 2003 and were paid under the 
General Schedule (GS) pay system. Three general performance measures were used: 
compensation (salary), annual performance ratings and promotions. Multivariate models 
were specified and estimated for each of these performance measures. The results 
indicate that females receive lower annual and hourly compensation and are less likely to 
be promoted than men even though they receive better performance ratings. The results 
also indicate that minorities are paid less and are less likely to be promoted than majority 
workers while veterans are paid more, perform better, and are more likely to become 
supervisors. The models also reveal that performance rating is a weak measure of 
productivity and that more highly educated employees are paid more and more likely to 
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1I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research is to examine the various factors that affect the job 
performance and career progression of DOD civilian workers. By understanding the 
career patterns and performance of DOD civilian employees, the present study will 
provide decision makers with additional tools to: 1) evaluate personnel productivity and 
performance issues; 2) improve the utilization of available resources; 3) increase DOD 
effectiveness in accomplishing tasks by improving workforce productivity; and 4) 
develop strategies for working with a diverse workforce.  
The study will focus on differences in job performance and career progression 
among various demographic groups and among employees with and without advanced 
education. It will specify and estimate performance rating, promotion, and earnings 
models for the cohort of civilian DOD employees hired in 1995 and will investigate the 
relationship between human capital characteristics and selected career outcomes. 
Human capital theory suggests that an individual’s productivity increases with 
additional education. It is generally assumed that education changes an individual in such 
a way as to increase her/his capacity to perform job-related tasks [Wise, “Academic 
Achievement,” 1975]. The thesis will examine the effect of possession of a postgraduate 
degree on promotion, earnings and performance ratings. Also, the thesis will address the 
correlation among compensation, grade level and job performance. 
Promotion is another important personnel issue within organizations. It is a 
primary means for individuals to advance their careers. From the employee’s point of 
view, promotion is important for meeting aspirations for increased responsibility, status 
and salary, while from the organization’s point of view promotion is a way to meet 
human resource staffing requirements and to identify quality leadership. As a result, 
promotions are not random events; they are the by-products of staffing decisions made 
within the organization. Thus, it is very beneficial to federal decision makers to know the 
key factors that affect promotions in the DOD environment. The study will identify the 
effect of education at entry (hiring) point on promotions and promotion speed. 
2The study will also investigate retention (workers’ quit decisions). A retention 
model will be useful to federal policy makers and personnel managers since public-sector 
worker turnover has only recently begun to receive rigorous attention (e.g., Borjas, 1982; 
and Burtless and Hausman, 1982). Federal compensation policy does have ramifications 
for employee retention with changes at the margin having a modest effect that varies 
across occupational groups. Labor market conditions, personal attitudes and job 
characteristics also influence individual decisions to leave (Black, Moffitt, Warner, 
1990). Consequently, an organization must carefully monitor retention rates to ensure 
that the most productive workers are being retained. If not, the organization will 
eventually find itself in dire straits because it will not have the workforce needed to 
accomplish its mission. 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Pay Systems and Promotion in the Federal Service. 
The federal system in the U.S. Federal Government consists of 67 different pay 
plan categories. However, the “General Schedule” (GS) pay system (plan) and the “Wage 
system rate” are the two major pay systems. This thesis focuses on the GS system since 
the majority of DOD civilian white-collar employees belong to that category. White-
collar employees represent the professional and technical portion of the DOD workforce. 
The GS System is a pay system used to set wages for employees who work in 
positions classified in the administrative, clerical, professional and technical occupational 
categories. It mainly consists of 15 grades, or salary levels, and 10 steps within each 
grade. Employees progress through the steps, according to job performance and length of 
service. Waiting periods exist for all GS grades. Table 1 shows the waiting periods for 
progression to the next higher step. 
Table 1. Step Increases and Waiting Periods for GS Federal Employees 
From Step To Step Waiting Periods (Weeks) 
1 2 52 
2 3 52 
3 4 52 
4 5 104 
5 6 104 
6 7 104 
7 8 156 
8 9 156 
9 10 156 
Source: Celik (2002) 
3When an employee is promoted to a higher grade, that individual is allowed no 
more than a two-step increase (within grade) above the salary he/she received before the 
promotion. Advancement to a higher step represents a 3% salary increase, while 
promotion to a higher grade results in a 10% salary rise.  When for some reason 
individuals have not reached the highest step for a specific position, they are advanced to 
the higher grade when the required time period is completed if their performance 
evaluation is rated at least “Full Successful” or equivalent and if no comparable increase 
was received during the period. 
Compensation is also adjusted for local cost-of-living differences, called locality 
pay. Starting in 1994, locality pay was implemented for GS employees to address a gap 
between Federal and non-Federal salaries in localities throughout the U.S. [Office of 
Personnel Management], except those who were covered under special salary rates. Table 
2 displays the General Schedule (base) pay for the year 1995, the year the employees in 
this sample first entered federal civil service. 
Table 2. General Schedule (Base) Pay Table 
GS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 12141 12546 12949 13352 13757 13994 14391 14793 14811 15183 
2 13650 13975 14428 14811 14974 15414 15854 16294 16734 17174 
3 14895 15392 15889 16386 16883 17380 17877 18374 18871 19368 
4 16721 17278 17835 18392 18949 19506 20063 20620 21177 21734 
5 18707 19331 19955 20579 21203 21827 22451 23075 23699 24323 
6 20852 21547 22242 22937 23632 24327 25022 25717 26412 27107 
7 23171 23943 24715 25487 26259 27031 27803 28575 29347 30119 
8 25662 26517 27372 28227 29082 29937 30792 31647 32502 33357 
9 28345 29290 30235 31180 32125 33070 34015 34960 35905 36850 
10 31215 32256 33297 34338 35379 36420 37461 38502 39543 40584 
11 34295 35438 36581 37724 38867 40010 41153 42296 43439 44582 
12 41104 42474 43844 45214 46584 47954 49324 50694 52064 53434 
13 48878 50507 52136 53765 55394 57023 58652 60281 61910 63539 
14 57760 59685 61610 63535 65460 67385 69310 71235 73160 75085 
15 67941 70206 72471 74736 77001 79266 81531 83796 86061 88326 
Source: http://www.opm.gov/oca/95tables/indexgs.asp//17-11-04 
Eligibility for federal GS jobs is determined by education and/or work experience 
[Defense Logistic Information Service]. With a high school degree or three months of 
general experience, the individual is qualified for GS-2 grade level positions. To qualify 
for GS-5 or GS-7 grade levels, the employee needs a Bachelor's degree or three years of 
increasingly responsible work experience after high school. An undergraduate degree and 
a grade point average of 3.0 or higher (or membership in an academic honor society) 
4meets eligibility requirements for the GS-7 grade level based on "Superior Academic 
Achievement." Applicants with Master's degrees are eligible for the GS-9 grade level, 
and those with Doctoral degrees may be considered for the GS-11 level. Grade levels for 
professional and administrative positions under the GS pay system initially increase in 2-
grade intervals (that is, GS-5, 9, and 11) and then in 1-grade intervals (that is, GS-12, 13, 
14, and 15).  
2. Performance Management in the Federal Service. 
There seems to be no completely satisfactory way to measure job performance 
(productivity). Some studies use salary and grade level as measures of success [Wise, 
1975]. They assume that an individual’s earnings reflect their marginal productivity and 
they link salary and performance directly. Other studies find that there is a substantial 
discrepancy in theories that imply a strong relation between wages and productivity 
[Medoff and Abraham, 1981].   
In general, employers believe they can rate the productivity (performance) of their 
employees. Adjusting relative wage rates to reflect rated performance produces three 
benefits to the firm: 1) it serves as an incentive for greater effort; 2) it attracts more 
capable workers to the firm; and 3) it reduces the probability of losing top performers to 
other firms. James Medoff and Katharine Abraham (1980) have presented evidence 
showing a positive association between experience and relative earnings within grade 
levels in three U.S. manufacturing corporations. However, they found no association 
between experience and rated performance (productivity proxy). These findings are 
contrary to human capital theory, which states that the higher earnings of the more-
experienced workers in a firm reflects their training which makes them more productive 
than their less experienced peers. 
According to the DOD Directive 1400.25 on “Civilian Personnel Management 
Systems” (1996) the objective of performance management is to improve individual, 
team and organizational performance. To fulfill this aim, the performance management 
system establishes: 1) management accountability for equal employment opportunity; 2) 
affirmative employment practices; and 3) employment principles. To measure 
performance, DOD uses a “Performance Appraisal System” which establishes 
performance appraisal requirements and complies with Federal regulations. Federal 
5employees are subject to periodic evaluations of their job performance and are classified 
according to a five-level rating scale shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Performance Appraisal Levels 
Levels Meaning of Codes 
1 Unsatisfactory 
2 Minimally Successful 
3 Fully Successful 
4 Exceeds Fully Successful 
5 Outstanding 
6 Not applicable 
Source: DMCD 
DOD employees with outstanding performance receive merit pay [Mehay and 
Pema, 2004]. 
3.  Merit Promotion in the Federal Service 
According to Condrey and Brudney (1992) federal agencies instituted merit pay 
in 1981 as part of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA). Due to numerous problems and 
criticisms of CSRA, Congress decided to replace that system with the Performance 
Management and Recognition System (PMRS) in 1984. The new system was not a retreat 
from the earlier one, but rather an attempt to reform and correct particular portions of the 
old system. 
The positions covered by the merit promotion system do not regard political, 
religious, or labor organization affiliation or non-affiliation, marital status, race, color, 
sex, national origin, disability, or age. The merit promotion system is based solely on job-
related criteria [Federal Merit Promotion Program]. To be eligible for promotion, 
employees generally must meet the position’s qualification requirements, the time-in-
grade requirements, the time-after-competitive-appointment restriction, and the 
requirements for fully successful performance. Employees are not promoted if their rating 
record is lower than “Fully Successful” at current grade or they have a below “Fully 
Successful” rating on a critical-to-performance element of the next higher grade of the 
career ladder. 
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II reviews relevant studies and 
the techniques used and summarize their findings. Chapter III describes the data set used 
6in this thesis and defines the variables used in the econometric models. Chapter IV 
estimates the econometric models and describes their results. Chapter V summarizes the 
results of the analysis and makes recommendations for further research.  
7II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are several prior studies that analyze performance, retention and promotion. 
However, only a few of them deal with career progression, job performance and retention 
in internal labor markets. This chapter discusses a few of the prior studies that analyze 
performance, retention and promotion. The prior studies serve as the basis for specifying 
and estimating the performance models developed in this thesis. 
The study “Pay, Promotion and Retention of High-Quality Civil Service 
Workers” [Asch, 2001] examined the factors that affect performance (pay), promotion 
and retention of civil service workers. The questions addressed were whether promotion 
speed varies across occupational areas and whether higher-quality personnel are 
promoted faster, are paid more, and stay longer in the organization. To do so, Asch used 
data on fulltime GS civil service workers in the Department of Defense (DOD). The 
analysis covered more than 19,000 civil service workers and used a longitudinal database 
constructed from Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) personnel files that tracked 
the careers of individuals who entered or reentered the DOD civil service in a given year. 
In particular, the analysis focused on those civilians who entered or reentered DOD in 
fiscal year 1988, before the defense draw down, and those who entered or reentered in 
fiscal year 1992, during the draw down. 
Three different models were created. The estimation methods used included 
ordinary least squares regression models (OLS) to analyze pay, and Cox regression 
models to analyze times to promotion and to separation (retention). The analysis relied on 
three measures of personnel quality: education, supervisor rating, and promotion speed. 
Three personnel outcomes were analyzed: pay, promotion speed, and length of stay. The 
personnel quality at time t was hypothesized to depend on education, motivation, ability 
and job factors, while an individual’s supervisor rating was hypothesized to depend on 
personnel quality, monitoring frequency, technology, cost and subjective assessment. 
Promotion speed was hypothesized to depend on supervisor rating, job vacancy, 
willingness to move up and eligibility for promotion. Retention was specified as a  
8function of promotion speed, pay and benefits inside and outside the civil service, and 
taste for federal service, while pay (performance) was defined as a function of supervisor 
rating, occupation, experience and seniority. 
Asch mentioned three types of potential bias in the analysis: 1) selection bias that 
arises because tracked employees are ones who decided to stay; 2) a measurement error 
created by the exclusion of bonuses and special pay from earnings, the dependent 
variable; and 3) measurement error in the education variable. To test and correct for 
selection bias, Asch divided the cohort into two groups based on year of service, denoted 
as t: 1) those who separated at year t; and 2) those who stayed beyond that year. She then 
ran a separate model for each group and compared the results. Where the results were 
similar, she concluded that no selection bias was present. Where the results were not 
similar the estimates provided an upper and a lower bound at each year of service of how 
compensation increases through year t. Asch did not take any action to correct the 
possible measurement error created by the exclusion of bonuses and special pay from 
earnings. She assumed that, since the analysis controlled for factors such as occupational 
areas and geographic region, then those factors partially explained the incidences of 
bonuses and special pays. Furthermore, she also did not take any action to correct the 
measurement error in the education variable. She argued that, if the measurement error 
were greater for more educated people, then the effect on pay of people who have higher 
education would be biased downwards.   
Taking into consideration the above, Asch found that, all else remaining constant, 
educated personnel and those who receive higher supervisor ratings--higher quality 
personnel--are paid more than those of lower quality--lower education and lower ratings. 
The analysis also found that: 1) higher-quality GS personnel are generally promoted 
faster; 2) the higher the supervisor rating, the faster the promotion speed; and 3) those 
with any college education are promoted faster than those without, with the exception 
that having advanced education beyond a BA degree did not always translate into faster 
promotion.   
Asch’s retention results were inconsistent.  For the fiscal year 1988 cohort, the 
analysis indicated that those who were better matched to the civil service (better 
9supervisor rating and faster promotion speed) had a stronger incentive to stay. For the 
fiscal year 1992 cohort, the evidence did not suggest that those who received better 
supervisor ratings stayed longer. In general, the analysis of retention in the DOD civil 
service provided some evidence that higher-quality personnel stayed longer, especially 
when quality was measured in terms of faster promotion and better performance rating. 
When the quality of personnel was measured in terms of education, retention results were 
different between the two cohorts. 
The regression results for the two cohorts also suggest that careers vary 
significantly across occupational areas, despite the fact that all GS DOD employees are 
covered under the same pay table. Asch’s analysis suggests that current DOD policies 
promote better GS workers and pay them more but may not be sufficient to retain them, 
especially employees with higher education. 
In their study “Gender Differences in Job Performance and Career Progression: 
Evidence from Personnel Data,” Stephen L. Mehay and Elda Pema (2004) tried to shed 
light on the issue of career experience and job productivity among males and females in a 
large hierarchical organization, the Department of Defense (DOD). They used a database 
of federal employees who were in the workforce in 1986. The Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC) provided the database, which was restricted to full-time employees, 
working inside the continental United States, possessing at least a Bachelor’s degree, 
aged between ages 20 and 55, and paid under the GS/GM (General Schedule/General 
Management) pay system. Because the dataset included homogeneous employees who 
worked under a single personnel system, the authors argued that it provided potential 
explanations for gender wage differentials observed in the labor market as a whole, and 
gender differences in career development, especially the existence of a glass ceiling on 
promotion in a large personnel system. 
Mehay and Pema constructed two performance-rating models and two promotion 
models. In their performance models, they used two measures of performance as 
dependent variables: 1) whether an individual ever received the top rating (value=1 or 
outstanding) during the period 1986-1992; and 2) the average rating level during the 
same period.  In their promotion models, they studied two promotion outcomes: 1) 
10
promotion to a higher grade (value of 1 if the individual was promoted at least once 
during the period 1986-1992); and 2) selection as a supervisor or manager (value of 1 if 
the employee was ever selected for a supervisory/managerial position). In the 
performance rating models, Mehay and Pema used explanatory variables for gender 
(female), race (black, Hispanic, other race), agency (Navy, USMC, USAF, Army) veteran 
and tenure, while in the promotion models they added prior performance.  
They recognized the existence of a potential selection bias problem, since those 
employees who leave the service may be non-randomly selected. To account for 
selection, they used a Heckman two-stage technique in the performance rating models 
and a full maximum-likelihood estimation technique (MLE) in the promotion and 
supervisor promotion models.   
Mehay and Pema found that women receive higher annual performance ratings, 
have superior promotion rates to those of men, and experience higher salary growth rates 
over time, and yet are less likely to be promoted to managerial and supervisory positions. 
They also concluded that a “glass ceiling” might exist in the federal workplace since 
female employees face constraints on their career progression. However, the discrepancy 
between men and women in selection to management jobs could be due either to different 
treatment of the female employees or to individual preferences. 
In 1988 DiPrete and Whitman published the study “Gender and Promotion in 
Segmented Job Ladder Systems.” They mentioned the fact that internal labor markets are 
segmented in various ways (job ladders, ladder groupings, ties), which create boundaries 
and make overall advancements dependent on such factors as the chances for 
advancements within a job ladder and the chances to switch to other job ladders. They 
showed how these contingencies created different career progressions between men and 
women in the federal civil service during the mid-1970s and how gender promotion 
differs by job level. In particular, they found that there were no gender differences in the 
higher and the lower grades. The greatest female disadvantage occurred in the mid grades 
and especially near the boundary between the upper and the lower grades. In short, they 
saw that gender difference in promotion rates varies by grade level in a systematic way.  
11
The authors used personnel data for a one-percent sample of white-collar 
employees of the federal government active between the years 1972 and 1977 and 
constructed three grade-promotion models: 1) one for the lower grades (GS1-GS4); 2) 
one for the middle grades (GS5-GS10); and 3) one model for grade promotions in the 
upper grades (GS11 and higher). They defined the dependent variable as a promotion of 
one or more grades that occurred within two years of each first entry into a given grade.  
As independent variables they used dummy variables for a Bachelor’s degree, 
female, minority, and veteran, and continuous variables for schooling and pre-
government work experience (defined by the equation: age - length of government 
service until the time of reaching the origin grade - years of education – 5 = pre-
government work experience). Independent variables also included: years of government 
service (the years of service prior to attaining the origin grade); first government job; 
irregular (a dummy variable for whether the employee had begun the career in an 
irregular, temporary-part time job status); proportion female in the job ladder (an 
indicator of the extent to which a job ladder is sex-segregated)1; the origin grade; the 
region and the agency of the original grade; a job designation variable; and a dummy 
variable for temporary leave (takes the value of 1 if a temporary leave or absence was 
taken during the two-year risk period of promotion). 
DiPrete and Soule found that not all women in the federal government were in the 
same boat in the middle 1970s. Five percent of the women who had reached 
administrative levels did experience the same rate of advancement as men. To reach that 
level, women faced three difficulties: 1) a lower entry grade than men; 2) lower 
advancement rates in the crucial middle grades; and 3) lower- to higher-tier promotions 
that were harder to obtain even after other factors were controlled. 
The authors concluded that there is no necessary relationship between sex 
segregation and career advancement. What matters is whether women’s jobs offer 
advancements prospects similar to those of men. They suggested that sex-neutral 
                                                 
1 The sex-segregation approach assumes that unequal initial placement, combined with mobility 
barriers to subsequent advancement, causes gender inequality. Among the factors that are responsible for 
the gender differences in advancement is sex segregation, which is the gender difference in distribution 
across job ladders. (DiPrete and Soule, 1988).  
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promotion policies will not eliminate gender inequalities, since women and men are hired 
in different grade levels in the organization. Even if they were hired in similar grade 
levels, gender differences would still exist, since women have lower advancement 
opportunities in their job ladders than men.  Finally, their analysis showed that older 
employees have a disadvantage in promotion, which also can be affected by the form of 
the employment relationship (part-time employees advance slower than full-time 
employees). 
Usan and Utoglu (1999) analyzed job performance of federal employees in their 
thesis “The Effect of Graduate Education on the Job Performance of Civilian Department 
of Defense Employees.” Their aim was to determine the most important demographic and 
background factors that influence job performance of DOD civilian employees, focusing 
on graduate education.  
Usan and Utoglu used data drawn from the Department of Defense Civilian 
Personnel Data Files, provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The 
data was restricted to full-time career and career-conditional civilian DOD employees 
who possessed at least a Bachelor’s degree, worked under the General Schedule (GS) or 
General Management (GM) pay system and worked in the continental U.S. in September 
1986. Employees who worked in the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency and in the Defense Intelligence Agency were excluded. The General 
Schedule (GS) and General Management (GM) systems were chosen because they are the 
primary white-collar system, which covers two thirds of the entire defense civilian 
workforce. The authors’ primary research question was to “estimate the effect of graduate 
education on the job performance of the DOD civilian employees”, while their secondary 






Usan and Utoglu used four different performance measures--salary level, 
promotion, performance rating and retention--to answer the above questions, and they 
constructed four multivariate models. For the salary model, they estimated semi-log 
earnings function based on equation (1):   
Ln (Y) =βο +βΧ+ε                                        (1)                              
where,  
Y = annual salary 
β ο = a constant term 
X = a vector that captures background characteristics, such as level of education 
attainment, federal experience, and other salary determinants 
β = a vector of parameters to be estimated 
ε = the random error term 
They estimated the OLS model in two steps: 1) without controlling for grade 
levels; and 2) controlling for grade levels. The other independent variables were race, 
gender, region, education, occupation and supervisory dummies. The authors concluded 
that: 1) women earn 10.72 percent less than men; 2) minorities earn less than whites; and 
3) federal experience is positively correlated to earnings, everything else held constant. 
After controlling for grade level, they found that having an M.A. does not change the 
annual salary substantially, while having a Ph.D. degree increases the annual salary by 
4.04 percent, compared to Bachelor’s degree holders. 
For the promotion model, they used a basic logit model given by equation (2): 
                                    Prob (promote) i =βο+βΧ+ε                                           (2) 
where, 
Prob (Promote) i = the probability of promotion for individual i 
X = a vector of personal demographics and background characteristics that 
influence the promotion behavior 
β = a vector of coefficients for the X factors 
βο = a constant term 
ε = the random error term 
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They suggested that since DOD is a “salary structure” organization, salary is often 
adjusted more or less automatically. Thus, employees’ performance can be more directly 
measured by looking at the upward movement in the organization hierarchy 
(promotions). They assumed that promotions, as a measurement of performance, might 
capture differences between persons not reflected in the salary models. 
The authors restricted the data set by excluding federal employees who left DOD 
by September 1992, since their promotions were not available, and focused instead on the 
employees who had not attained any additional degree between 1986 and 1992 and were 
between 22 and 65 years old. 
 The dependent variable was based on the individual’s last promotion and was 
coded one 1 if the individual was promoted at least one time between 1986 and 1992. As 
independent variables, they used gender, race, education, occupation, functional area, 
veteran status, and supervisory and performance ratings. Four different specifications of 
the basic model were run: 1) one without controls for grade level and performance rating; 
2) one with only grade controls added; 3) one with only performance rating added; and 4) 
one with both grade level and performance rating added. 
The authors found that education variables are statistically significant in the 
promotion probability models, but the effect of education is negative when an 
individual’s grade level is not controlled. The results indicate that advanced degree 
holders have fewer opportunities to be promoted since they usually occupy initial jobs at 
higher-grade levels. They also found that females are more likely to be promoted than 
men, while minorities are less likely to be promoted compared to whites, all other factors 
remaining constant. Veterans and supervisors are not promoted as fast as non-veterans 
and non-supervisors and one additional year of federal service decreases the promotion 
probability, all else being equal.  
Retention is the decision to leave or stay in an organization and primarily depends 
on the individual. Organizations, on the other hand, want to retain the qualified and more 
capable employees in their workforce in order to increase productivity, reduce manpower 
and training cost and have a positive return on the training investment they made. 
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Usan and Utoglu classified the factors that affect retention into four categories: 1) 
wage effects; 2) cyclical effects; 3) age and job tenure effects; and 4) cost of leaving. 
They constructed a retention model using the probability to stay as the dependent 
variable, which is coded 1 if the individual remained as an employee of DOD between 
the years 1986 and 1992. The explanatory variables in the retention model include sex, 
race, age, veteran status, functional areas, the number of federal years, and the average 
performance rating the employees received for the years between 1986 and 1992. Two 
models were analyzed: one for all employees and one for the new hires in 1986.  
Their results, for the model that included all the employees, indicate that women 
are less likely than men to stay. Each additional year of age at entry reduces the retention 
rate.  Furthermore, a person with one more federal service year is more likely to stay, all 
else remaining constant. Prior performance rating is positively related to retention while 
possession of a Master’s or PhD degree is negatively related. 
The model for the “new hires” indicates that veterans and older workers have 
higher retention rates, which is consistent with the existing literature that states that older 
people are less likely to change jobs and younger workers have greater job mobility. 
Performance rating is positively correlated to retention, while educational variables (MA, 
PhD) have negative relationships, indicating that in early years of employment people are 
more likely to change jobs.  
Usan and Utoglu pointed out three drawbacks in using performance ratings to 
measure job productivity: 1) supervisors might be “harsh raters” or “easy raters”; 2) harsh 
raters give lower than true evaluations while easy raters give higher than true evaluations; 
3) supervisors might also be influenced by the employee’s personal characteristics (race, 
sex, tenure) or might not want to give extremely low or high ratings.  
The authors created two logit models, one estimated for the employee inventory 
for the year 1986 and one estimated for the new hires in 1986. The dependent variable 
was defined as 1 if the average performance rating over the 8-year period (1986-1994) 
exceeded the mean for the person. The data they used included employees between 22 
and 65 who had valid performance ratings and unchanged education attainment between  
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1986 and 1992 (for the inventory model). As explanatory variables, they used gender, 
race, supervisor, veteran status, education supervisory status, federal experience, 
occupational groups, and functional areas. 
They concluded that for all occupational groups and functional areas (except other 
white collar), being a female, veteran supervisor or advanced degree holder are positively 
correlated with performance, while minority status and more federal years in the service 
are negatively correlated with being in the top half of the distribution of the performance 
ratings.   
In the “new hire model”, the federal years variable was excluded since it did not 
have any meaning (all observations were at the beginning of the federal career). The 
majority of the variables had the expected signs. The only exceptions were that females 
and veterans were less likely to be in the top half of all performance ratings.  
In his study “Pay, Experience, and Productivity: The Government-Sector Case” 
Bruce H. Dunson (1985) tested the hypothesis that earnings differences among workers is 
due to experienced workers being more productive. He focused on civilian middle 
managers and professionals in the Department of Defense and used a relatively unused 
data source--the Department of Defense Civilian Master and Transaction file that 
contains data for all civilian DOD employees. 
After restricting the data to full-time workers, Dunson used as an index of 
performance the performance ranking required by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1980, 
which ranks employees into one of five categories: 1 = outstanding; 2 = exceeds fully 
successful; 3 = fully successful; 4 = minimally successful; 5 = unsatisfactory. Because 
very few people were reported as unsatisfactory, only categories 1 through 4 were used in 
his analysis.  
Dunson estimated a standard semi-log earnings model as given by equation (1) 
above. The independent variables included education, pre-government experience, pre-
government experience squared, government experience, government experience 
squared, performance rating, regional dummies, and grade level. He estimated three  
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models: 1) one with no controls for performance rating and grade level; 2) one with 
grade-level dummy variables included; and 3) one with both performance rating and 
grade level variables. 
One interesting finding from the first model is the lack of variation in pay by 
education, especially for Navy Department employees. After Dunson controlled for 
education, age and region, he found that the more-experienced employees earned more 
than their less-experienced peers. Two other significant findings emerged from Dunson’s 
analysis. First, Master’s and PhD degree holders earned more than those with Bachelor’s 
degrees because they occupied higher grades. Persons who received higher ratings on 
average earned more than those with lower performance evaluations, but the difference in 
pay associated with performance evaluation was extremely small, less than 1 to 2 percent. 
The second and most important finding is that although human capital and earnings are 
positively correlated, performance does not seem to be positively correlated to human 
capital. 
John Bishop (1987) in his study “The Recognition and Reward of Employee 
Performance” examined the extent to which an individual’s wage depends on his/her 
relative productivity. He assumed that most hiring selections are based on incomplete 
information due to the very small investment most employers make in their hiring 
decisions. The major questions he tried to answer were the following: What parameters 
explain wage growth, promotions and demotions? What is the effect of a worker’s 
relative productivity on his/her relative wage? To what extent are productivity 
differentials incorporated into relative wage rates? 
Bishop concluded that employers, in general, believe they can rate the 
productivity (performance) of their employees by adjusting relative wage rates. 
Performance-based wages produce three kinds of benefits for the firm. They: 1) serve as 
an incentive for greater effort; 2) attract more capable workers; and 3) reduce the 
probability of losing the best performers to other firms. However, worker productivity 
information is difficult and costly to obtain, leading to limits on the adjustments of wage 
rates to productivity. Bishop addressed six reasons for these limits: 1) the inevitability of 
significant errors in measuring productivity; 2) the variation in   productivity over time; 
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3) the worker’s productivity differentials which are either not visible to other employees 
or specific to the firm; 4) worker risk aversion; 5) the deferred compensation of 
performance; and 6) the recognition of productivity in other, non-pecuniary ways (praise, 
desirable job assignment, greater autonomy, lower likelihood of layoff). 
Bishop used retrospective longitudinal data on wage rates, turnover, and reported 
productivity of a pair of new hires, for the same or similar job, derived from the 1982 
National Center for Research in Vocational Education Employer Survey. The first 
member of the pair was obtained by selecting the last employee the company hired prior 
to August 1981, while the second member of the pair was chosen by asking the employer 
to identify “an employee with similar position but with some prior vocational training”.  
The survey collected data from 3412 employers from selected geographic areas across the 
U.S. Its strategy was to pick firms with a relatively high proportion of low-wage workers 
and where the respondents were owners or managers and were familiar with the 
performance of each of the firm’s employees.   
Bishop defined the dependent variable of the performance model as the deviation 
of the individual wage from the mean for workers with similar tenure. For independent 
variables he used: 1) the deviation of the individual’s productivity from the mean; 2) the 
difference between the training individual i needs to perform satisfactorily and that 
needed by the typical new hire; and 3) differences in credentials, background 
characteristics, and tenure between the individual and the mean for other new hires.  
Since no data was available on the mean, he used data on two workers doing the same 
job. 
Bishop found that relative productivity does have important and reasonably rapid 
effects on related wage rates at small and medium firms but no effect at larger companies 
where wages responded slowly to productivity. Bishop also presented evidence that wage 
rate differentials partially reflect variances in productivity for workers with one year of 
tenure and that there is no immediate response of relative wage rates to productivity in 
very large establishments. Finally, Bishop suggested that the assumption “individual 
wages are equal to individual marginal products” must be weakened or replaced by a new 
hypothesis: “that wages are equal to the average marginal product of all workers with the 
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same tenure.” Therefore, when evaluating training programs, we must take under 
consideration the fact that the true effects on productivity might be different from their 
effects on earnings. 
In his study “Gender and Promotions: Promotion Chances of White Men and 
Women in Federal White-Collar Employment,” Gregory B. Lewis (1986) examined the 
impact of gender on promotion probabilities for federal white-collar GS employees. The 
analysis was based on data derived from the Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) for the 
period from 1973 to 1982, maintained by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM). The data was restricted to full-time employees of the General Schedule (GS), 
Merit Pay, or Senior Executive Service (SES) pay systems.  
He used a binary dependent variable, which indicated whether the employee was 
or was not promoted during the year, and specified a standard human capital model. As 
independent variables he included “years of federal experience” and its squared term, the 
“pre-government experience” and the “years of education” and their squared terms, 
veteran preference, age and grade dummy variables. 
Lewis found that promotion prospects fall with each level of federal experience 
more quickly for men than for women. His analysis showed that promotion rates by 
length of federal service are higher for white males than their female peers when 
promoted during the first five years of service and lower each year thereafter. Potential 
experience (the experience the worker has before joining the service) had less impact on 
promotions for women than for men, but its impact was not as strong as that of federal 
experience. Furthermore, Lewis concluded that grade level had less impact than initially 
projected, that promotion prospects were lower at higher grades, and that veteran males 
seemed to move up faster in the federal hierarchy ladder, compared to the non-veterans. 
Finally, education was found to have a small effect on promotion probabilities. In 
general, a variety of indicators suggested that female federal employees have advantages 
in promotions when compared to their male colleagues.    
In her qualitative study “Through the Glass Ceiling: Prospects for the 
Advancement of Women in the Federal Civil Service,” Katherine C. Naff (1994) tried to 
identify the barriers that exist between men and women in the U.S. federal civil service.  
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Although gender discrimination has been illegal in the U.S. since 1964, women tend to be 
underrepresented in managerial ranks. The author examined the factors that account for 
women’s advancements using a unique dataset compiled by the U.S. Merit Systems 
Protection Board (MSPB). The dataset was collected during the years 1991 and 1992 and 
contained three sources of information: “hard data” collected on federal employees and 
maintained in a Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) by the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM), focus groups of middle- and senior-level federal employees, and a 
government survey of federal employees (Merit System Protection Board, 1992). 
Naff discussed the “glass ceiling” as encompassing the nature of barriers that limit 
women’s advancement, and women’s opinions about how they are treated in the working 
environment. She defined five factors that affect career advancement: 1) experience 
(length of federal service); 2) education; 3) relocation; 4) time developed to the job; and 
5) children. Seniority (length of federal service) and education are the two most important 
human capital variables, according to the author. The longer someone has worked for the 
government, the greater the number of promotions. Career advancement and the number 
of geographic relocations are expected to have a positive influence on advancement, 
along with the time devoted to work. However, women with children are expected to be 
promoted less than women without children, even after controlling for education, 
experience and relocation. 
Naff concluded that there is a glass ceiling in the federal government. Women are 
held back and not promoted because of stereotypes and various assumptions unrelated to 
their stock of human capital. The usual assumption is that employees who deserve a 
promotion who are the most committed, who relocate as necessary, and who, when 
needed, put in the longest work hours. If women are not willing to relocate or work late, 
especially when they have children, they may be treated differently when being 
considered for career-enhancing assignments and for promotion. On the other hand, 
stereotypes about women’s abilities encourage their promotion slowdown, which causes 
them to believe that they work in a hostile environment.   
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A summary of the previous studies on career progression, job performance and 
retention is presented in Table 4. The table provides information on the key elements of 
each study, including the data source, empirical methods and key findings. 
 
Table 4. A Summary of the Previous Studies on Career Progression, Job Performance and 
Retention. 
AUTHOR/TOPIC DATA SOURCE TECHNIQUES FINDINGS 
Asch (2000) 
Pay, Promotion and Retention of High-
Quality Civil Service Workers 
DMDC 
Personal files 
- OLS Regression 
Models. 






Better educated with 
higher ratings are 
paid more and 
promoted faster. 
 
Mehay and  Pema (2004) 
Gender Differences in Job Performance 
and Career Progression: Evidence from 
Personnel Data 
DMDC 
Personnel Data Base 
- OLS Regression 
Models. 
- Logistic regression 
Models. 






ratings, have higher 
salary growth and 
superior promotion 




DiPrete and Whitman (1988) 
Gender and Promotion in Segmented Job 
Ladder Systems 





Older people have 
disadvantage in 
promotion. 
Usan and Utoglu (1999) 
The Effect on the Job Performance of 
Civilian Department of Defense 
Employee. 
DMDC 
DoD Civilian Data 
files 
- OLS Regression 
Models 
- Logistic regression 
Education is 
negatively related to 
promotion when 




minorities are less 
likely to be 
promoted. Women 
are retained less and 
performance rating is 
a weak way to 
measure 
productivity. In new 
hired cohorts 
veterans and older 
workers have higher 
retention rates. 
Performance rating is 
positively correlated 
to retention while 
education variables 




Pay Experience and Productivity: The 





- OLS Regression 
Models 
Master’s, PhD 
earned more than 
Bachelor’s because 
they occupied higher 
grades. Persons who 
receive higher 
ratings earn more. 
Performance is 
positively correlated 
with human capital. 
Bishop (1987) 
The Recognition and Reward of 
Employee Performance 
1982 National 
Center for Research 
in Vocational 
Education Survey. 
- OLS Regression 
Models 
Relative productivity 
has no effect on 
wages at big firms.  
Evidence that wage 
differentials partially 
reflect variances in 
worker’s 
productivity.  
Suggests that wages 
are equal to the 
average marginal 
product of all 




Gender and Promotions: Promotion 
Chances of White Men and Women in 
Federal White-Collar Employment 
Central Personnel 
Data File (DPDF). 
- Logistic regression Promotion rates 
higher for white 
males than female 
peers. Promotion 
prospects are lower 
at higher grades and 
education has a small 
effect on promotion. 
Female employees 
have advantage in 
promotion when 
compared to males. 
Naff (1994) 
Through the Glass Ceiling: Prospects for 
the Advancement of Women in the 
Federal Civil Service 
Central Personnel 




- OLS Regression 
Models 
Defined five factors 




time devoted to 
work, children. 
Concluded there is a 
glass ceiling for 
women in the federal 
government. They 
are often treated 






III. DATA, MODELS, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This chapter describes the data set and the methods used to specify and construct 
multivariate career progression and job performance models. It provides information 
about the independent and explanatory variables, and presents descriptive statistics of the 
variables. 
A. DATA 
The data used for this thesis were drawn from the Department of Defense Civilian 
Personnel Data Files provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The data 
set consisted of civilian employees who were newly hired in 1995. Information was 
available for each individual from 1995 to 2003. The file was restricted to federal 
employees who were paid under the GS pay system. 
The raw data file included 18,777 observations and 461 variables. The data 
elements consisted of personal demographics and service background information such as 
Sex, Race, Age, Agency, Education Level, Veteran Status, Federal Service Years, 
Functional Areas, Occupational Category (PATCO), Region, Grade Level, Supervisory 
or Managerial Status, Yearly Compensation, and Performance Rating Evaluations. 
Several categories of explanatory variables were used. For the purpose of the 
thesis, I divided Race into four groups: White, Black, Hispanic and Other Race. I divided 
Occupational category (PATCO) into six sub-categories: Professional, Administrative, 
Technical, Clerical, Other White Collar, and Blue-Collar employees. I divided Functional 
Area into seven groups: Force and Fleet, Intelligence and Communication, Material, 
Training and Education, Medical, Department Headquarters, and Administrative 
Activities. I divided Agency into four categories: Navy, Army, Air Force and Other 
Agent. Finally, I divided Educational Level into four categories: Bachelor’s Degree, 
Master’s Degree (MA_MS95), Ph.D. Degree (PhD95), and Other Education (less than 
bachelor’s level). Variable names and variable description of the inventory of new hires 
that stayed until 2003 are listed in Table 5. Their descriptive statistics are provided in 
Table 6. Means are calculated for male and females, and for all employees. The last  
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column of Table 6 represents the results of a t-test of difference-in-group means between 
males and females for each variable. Information about the average progression until year 
2003 per grade of entry is provided in Table 7. 
 
Table 5. Variable Names and Variable Description as of Year 1995 (Inventory 
Data, Only Stayers) 
Variable Name Variable Description  
Female  1=Female 
0=Male 
Black 1= Black 
0= Not Black 
Hispanic 1= Hispanic 
0= Not Hispanic 
Other_Race 1= Other Race 
0= Not Other Race 
White* 1= White 
0= Not White 
Veteran 1= Veteran 
0= Not Veteran 
Total_Federal_Service_95 Federal Service Experience as of year 1995 
Total_Federal_Service_95sq Federal Service Experience squared as of year 1995 
Veter_Fed_Experience Interaction between the variables: Veteran and Total Federal 
Experience 
Labor_Market_Experience Labor Market Experience as of year 1995 
Labor_Market_Experience_sq Labor Market Experience squared as of year 1995 
Other_Agent 1= Other Agent 
0= Not Other Agent 
Navy 1= Navy 
0= Not Navy 
USMC 1= USMC 
0= Not USMC 
USAF 1= USAF 
0= Not USAF 
Army* 1= Army 
0= Not Army 
Bachelor_Degree 1= Individual has a Bachelor’s degree in 1995 
0= Individual does not have a Bachelor’s degree in 1995 
MA_MS95 1= Individual has a Master’s degree in 1995 
0= Individual does not have a Master’s degree in 1995 
PhD95 1= Individual has a Ph.D. degree in 1995 
0= Individual does not have a Ph.D. degree in 1995 
Other_Education* 1= Individual has other education in 1995 
0= Individual does not have other education in 1995 
Education_Change Additional years spent by employees, to attain academic 
degrees during 1995-2003 
Grade1 Employee’s grade as of year 1995 
High_Performance 1= Individual has high performance 
0= Individual does not have high performance 
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Average_Rating1 Average performance evaluations during 1995-2003 
ONETOP 1= Individual received top rating during 1995-2003 
0= Individual did not receive top rating during 1995-2003 
Num_Of_Promotions1 Total number of grade increase during 1995-2003 
Promotion_03 1= Individual promoted at least once during 1995-2003 
0= Individual was not promoted during 1995-2003 
Supervisor_Promotion 1= Individual promoted to supervisor position 
0= Individual was not promoted to supervisor position 
Age_951 Individual’s age in 1995 
Avg_Performance96_981 Average performance evaluation during 1996-1998 
Hourly_Compensation1 Employee’s hourly wage 
Compensation_031 Employee’s annual salary in 2003 
Compensation_951 Employee’s annual salary in 1995 
               Source: DMDC 
                      *= Base group 
                 1=Continuous Variable 
 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of DOD Civilian Personnel as of Year 1995 (Inventory 
Data, Only Stayers) 
Variable Definition ALL MALE ONLY FEMALE ONLY 
 MEAN STD.DEV MEAN STD.DEV MEAN STD.DEV 
t-test  
(P-value) 
High_Performance 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.92 
Average_Rating1 4.21 0.61 4.21 0.61 4.22 0.61 0.41 
ONETOP 0.82 0.38 0.82 0.37 0.82 0.38 0.61 
Num_Of_Promotions1 2.27 2.21 2.33 2.21 2.21 2.21 0.03** 
Promotion_03 0.75 0.42 0.77 0.41 0.74 0.43 0.003*** 
Compensation_95 $26912 11726 $30,098 12607 $22,896 10039 0.0001*** 
Supervisor_Promotion 0.17 0.38 0.22 0.41 0.11 0.32 0.0001*** 
Total_Federal_Service_951 4.47 5.48 4.38 5.43 4.59 5.54 0.199 
Education_Change1 0.29 1.064 0.32 1.13 0.24 0.96 0.0001*** 
Female 0.44 0.49 0 0 1 0  
Black 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.31 0.19 0.39 0.0001*** 
Hispanic 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.064 0.24 0.05** 
Other_Race 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.62 
Veteran 0.30 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.08 0.28 0.0001*** 
Bachelor_Degree 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.17 0.37 0.0001*** 
MA_MS95 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.22 0.0001*** 
PhD95 0.014 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.0063 0.07 0.0001*** 
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Other_Agent 0.16 0.37 0.11 0.32 0.23 0.42 0.0001*** 
Navy 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.36 0.0001*** 
USAF 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.0001*** 
USMC 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.04** 
Grade1 7.21 3.14 8.18 3.07 5.98 2.78 0.0001*** 
Age_951 37.5 8.71 38.5 9.07 36.35 8.06 0.0001*** 
OBS 5732 3197 2535  
  Source: DMDC 
  1=Continuous Variable. 
  *** Significant at 0.01 level, ** Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.1level 
 
 
Table 7. Average Grade Growth per Grade of Entry (Only Stayers) 
Grade of entry in 
1995 
Average Grade in 
2003 
S.D. Min/Max 
5 8.08 2.60 5/14 
6 7.97 1.96 6/13 
7 11.27 1.90 7/15 
8 9.97 1.63 8/14 
9 10.90 1.33 9/15 
10 10.77 0.88 10/13 
11 12.03 0.84 11/15 
12 12.53 0.76 12/15 
13 13.68 0.73 13/15 
14 14.30 0.46 14/15 
15 15 0 15/15 
 Source: Author 
Three major indicators of civilian employees’ job performances were used: 1) 
promotion; 2) compensation; and 3) annual performance evaluations. Three separate 
measures of promotion were used: promotion to a higher grade by year 2003, the total 
number of promotions between 1995 and 2003, and promotion to a managerial or 
supervisory position by year 2003. As salary measures, I used the logarithm of total 
compensation and the logarithm of the hourly compensation. Several measures based on 
annual appraisals were used. A dummy variable was created for receiving the top rating 
(ONETOP), average grade, and high performance. Each performance variable is 
discussed in their sections. 
Education_Change is a continuous variable used as independent variable and 
represents the additional years spent by DOD employees to attain additional academic 
degrees during the 1995-2003 period. ONETOP takes the value of 1 if the individual ever 
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received the top rating during the 1995-2003 period. Supervisor_Promotion takes the 
value of 1 if the federal employee ever was promoted to supervisor of a managerial 
position. Promotion_03 takes the value of 1 if the individual received at least one 
promotion between the years 1995 and 2003. High_Performance takes the value of 1 if 
the individual’s average number of top rating (ONETOP) is greater than the group’s 
onetop average plus one standard deviation. The log of Hourly_Compensation represents 
the logarithm of the employee’s hourly wage. The log of Compensation_03 represents the 
logarithm of employee’s annual salary for the year 2003. Num_Of_Promotions represents 
the total number of grade increases the employee received during the 1995-2003 period. 
Avg_Performance96_98 represents the average performance evaluations the employee 
received during the period 1996-1998. Average_Rating represents the average 
performance evaluations the employee received during the period 1996-2003. 
Labor_Market_Experience represents the working experience the individual had before 
joining DOD in 1995, calculated as: 
Labor_Market_Experience=Age_95-Years of Education-Total_Federal_Service_Years95- 6 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 6 highlight the statistically significant 
differences between men and women hired as civilian employees in the year 1995. 
Women represent about 44% of the incoming workforce. The overall promotion rate is 
75%, but women are promoted at lower rate (74%) than men (77%) and the difference is 
statistically significant (p=0.003). Within the sample, 17% are promoted to managerial or 
supervisor positions, but for women the rate is only 11%, compared to 22% for men, a 
statistically significant difference (p=0.0001). Women receive less credit for prior federal 
years of service than men (4.59 years versus 4.38), are younger (36.3 versus 38.5), 
receive a lower beginning salary ($22,896 versus $30,098), and are hired at a lower entry 
grade (5.98 versus 8.18). 
Table 7 presents employee’s average grade growth by grade of entry for the 1995-
2003 period. An employee who joined DOD in 1995 at grade 5 received on average 3.08 
grade increases until 2003 and his/hers grade becomes 8.08. Similarly, an employee who 
enters DOD at the seventh grade received 4.27 average promotions by 2003.A more 
detailed discussion will be provided in chapter IV. 
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B.  MODELS 
1. Salary Models 
When compensation (salary) is used as a measurement of job performance, there 
is an assumption that salary is adjusted to match individual performance [Wise, “Personal 
Attributes,” 1975]. Two different salary models are specified: 1) one, which estimates the 
logarithm of hourly compensation (wage); and 2) one, which estimates the logarithm of 
annual salary.  
a. The Log of Hourly Compensation Model 
The (Log of Hourly Compensation) model estimates the determinants of 
the log of hourly wages of DOD employees hired in 1995 who were still in service in 
2003. The model is estimated by OLS regression and estimates the effect of gender, 
federal and non-federal experience, education, grade, race, veteran and education change 
on the logarithm of hourly compensation. The dependent variable Hourly_Compensation 
is based on the formula: 
Hourly_Compensation = [Compensation _03/ (Time in hours worked per 
week*52)]. Descriptive statistics for the Hourly Compensation model are shown in Table 
8. 
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for the Log Hourly Compensation Model. 
Binary Variables  Mean S.D 
Female=1 if Female 0.44 0.49 
Black=1 if Black 0.14 0.35 
Hispanic=1 if Hispanic 0.05 0.23 
Other_Race=1 if Other race 0.08 0.27 
White  (Base group) 0.70 0.45 
Veteran=1 If veteran 0.30 0.46 
Army (Base group) 0.40 0.49 
Navy=1 If Navy 0.18 0.38 
USMC=1 If USMC 0.02 0.14 
USAF=1 If USAF 0.22 0.41 
Other_Agent=1 If Other Agent 0.21 0.41 
Bachelor_Degree=1 If Bachelor 0.21 0.41 
MA_MS95=1 If Master’s 0.08 0.27 
PhD95=1 If Ph.D. 0.014 0.12 
Other_Education (Base group) 0.68 0.46 
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES   
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95  4.47 5.48 
Labor_Market_Experience 13.09 9.65 
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Education_Change 0.58 1.44 
Grade (1-15) 7.21 3.14 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
 
 
Log Hourly_Compensation  3.07 0.407 
OBS= 5,691   
 
b. The Log of Annual Compensation Model. 
The (Log of Annual Compensation) model includes 5,718 observations 
and explains the variation of the log of annual compensation for 2003. It uses the same 
independent variables as in the (Log Hourly Compensation) model. The mean of the log 
of Annual_ Compensation is 10.71. 
2. Promotion Models 
Since promotion measures one’s career progression [Wise, “Personal Attributes,” 
1975] I investigated the relationship between promotion and performance rating, 
education, gender, race, federal experience, non-federal experience, and veteran status. 
Three promotion related models were constructed: 1) a supervisor promotion model, 
where the binary dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the employee ever becomes 
manager or supervisor; 2) a (Promotion) model, where the binary Y variable takes the 
value of 1 if the employee ever receives a promotion to a higher grade during the 1995-
2003 period; and 3) a (Number of Promotions) model, where Y measures the number of 
promotions between years 1995 - 2003. 
a.  Supervisor Promotion Model 
The probit model regresses the probability of being a supervisor on sex, 
race, education, federal experience, labor experience, agency, grade, veterans and average 
rating. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for the Supervisor Promotion Model 
Binary Variables  Mean S.D 
Female=1 if Female 0.44 0.49 
Black=1 if Black 0.14 0.35 
Hispanic=1 if Hispanic 0.05 0.23 
Other_Race=1 if Other race 0.08 0.27 
White  (Base group) 0.70 0.45 
Veteran=1 If veteran 0.30 0.46 
Army (Base group) 0.40 0.49 
30
Navy=1 If Navy 0.18 0.38 
USMC=1 If USMC 0.02 0.14 
USAF=1 If USAF 0.22 0.41 
Other_Agent=1 If Other Agent 0.21 0.41 
Bachelor_Degree=1 If Bachelor 0.21 0.41 
MA_MS95=1 If Master’s 0.08 0.27 
PhD95=1 If Ph.D. 0.014 0.12 




Total_Federal_Service_Years_95 4.48 5.50 
Labor_Market_Experience 13.15 9.67 
Average_Rating 4.21 0.61 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE   
Supervisor_Promotion 0.12 0.32 
OBS=5,708   
 
b. Promotion 2003 Model 
The promotion 2003 model analyzes promotion to a higher grade via a 
probit model. The outcome is coded 1 if the individual advanced to a higher grade during 
the years 1995-2003.  Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Descriptive Statistics for the Promotion 2003 Model 
Binary Variables  Mean S.D 
Female=1 if Female 0.44 0.49 
Black=1 if Black 0.14 0.35 
Hispanic=1 if Hispanic 0.05 0.23 
Other_Race=1 if Other race 0.08 0.27 
White  (Base group) 0.70 0.45 
Veteran=1 If veteran 0.30 0.46 
Army (Base group) 0.40 0.49 
Navy=1 If Navy 0.18 0.38 
USMC=1 If USMC 0.02 0.14 
USAF=1 If USAF 0.22 0.41 
Other_Agent=1 If Other Agent 0.21 0.41 
Bachelor_Degree=1 If Bachelor 0.21 0.41 
MA_MS95=1 If Master’s 0.08 0.27 
PhD95=1 If Ph.D. 0.014 0.12 
Other_Education (Base group) 0.68 0.46 
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES   
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Total_Federal_Service_Years_95 4.48 5.50 
Labor_Market_Experience 13.11 9.67 
Avg_Performance96_98 4.42 0.65 
Grade (1-15) 7.22 3.13 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE   
Promotion_03 0.7567 0.429 
OBS=5,537   
 
c.  Number of Promotions Model 
Hierarchical organizations are often salary structured. Each position is 
assigned to a grade level, which is connected to a basic salary. From that perspective, the 
rate of upward movement (number of promotions) may be a measure of performance and 
may entail useful information about an employee’s actual productivity. The model was 
estimated as OLS. Descriptive statistics for the (Number of Promotions) model are shown 
in Table 11. The average individual hired in 1995, who stayed until 2003, received 
slightly over two promotions.  
 
Table 11. Descriptive Statistics for the (Number of Promotions) Model 
Binary Variables  Mean S.D 
Female=1 if Female 0.44 0.49 
Black=1 if Black 0.14 0.35 
Hispanic=1 if Hispanic 0.05 0.23 
Other_Race=1 if Other race 0.08 0.27 
White  (Base group) 0.70 0.45 
Veteran=1 If veteran 0.30 0.46 
Army (Base group) 0.40 0.49 
Navy=1 If Navy 0.18 0.38 
USMC=1 If USMC 0.02 0.14 
USAF=1 If USAF 0.22 0.41 
Other_Agent=1 If Other Agent 0.21 0.41 
Bachelor_Degree=1 If Bachelor 0.21 0.41 
MA_MS95=1 If Master’s 0.08 0.27 
PhD95=1 If Ph.D. 0.014 0.12 
Other_Education (Base group) 0.68 0.46 
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES   
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95 4.48 5.50 
Labor_Market_Experience 13.11 9.67 
Avg_Performance96_98 4.42 0.65 
Grade (1-15) 7.22 3.13 
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE   
Num_Of_Promotions 1.69 2.02 
OBS=5,537   
 
3.  Performance Models 
DOD is an organization with fixed-length employment contracts. The annual 
performance ratings by supervisors provide the only official measurement of annual 
performance. Three performance models were created: 1) a (High Performance) probit 
model where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if an individual’s average 
performance is greater than the group’s average performance by one standard deviation; 
2) an OLS regression model where the continuous dependent variable Average Rating is 
the average performance rating DOD workers received between 1995 and 2003; and 3) a 
probit model where the dependent variable ONETOP takes the value of 1 if the individual 
ever received the top rating (value = 5 or ‘outstanding’) on any rating during the 1995-
2003 period. Descriptive statistics of the performance models are presented in Tables 12. 
 
Table 12. Descriptive Statistics for the Performance Models 
Binary Variables  Mean S.D 
Female=1 if Female 0.44 0.49 
Black=1 if Black 0.14 0.35 
Hispanic=1 if Hispanic 0.05 0.23 
Other_Race=1 if Other race 0.08 0.27 
White  (Base group) 0.70 0.45 
Veteran=1 If veteran 0.30 0.46 
Army (Base group) 0.40 0.49 
Navy=1 If Navy 0.18 0.38 
USMC=1 If USMC 0.02 0.14 
USAF=1 If USAF 0.22 0.41 
Other_Agent=1 If Other Agent 0.21 0.41 
Bachelor_Degree=1 If Bachelor 0.21 0.41 
MA_MS95=1 If Master’s 0.08 0.27 
PhD95=1 If Ph.D. 0.014 0.12 
Other_Education (Base group) 0.68 0.46 
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES   
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95 4.48 5.50 
Labor_Market_Experience 13.11 9.67 
Grade (1-15) 7.22 3.13 
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES   
High_Performance 0.27 0.44 
ONETOP 0.71 0.44 
Average_Rating 4.21 0.67 
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IV. RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL MODELS 
A.  THE ROLE OF SELECTION 
Due to attrition, the number of civilian employees still in the civil service by 2003 
is not the same as the number of employees hired in 1995. If those who left service after 
1995 are non-randomly selected, then the model’s parameters might be biased. A non-
random sample selection problem can cause inconsistency in the dependent variables of 
the econometric models, due to the violation of the random sampling assumption 
[Heckman, 1979]. Non-random selection problems arise when: 1) we have truncated 
samples; 2) survey responders fail to provide answers to certain questions, which lead to 
missing data for the dependent or the independent variables; 3) there is ‘incidental’ 
truncation; and 4) using panel data, some people leave the sample due to attrition. 
[Wooldridge, 2003]. 
In a truncated regression model we leave out, on the basis of the dependent 
variable, a subset of the population and we do not observe any related information. 
Incidental truncation occurs when we do not observe the dependent variable due to the 
outcome of another variable and we observe only certain outcomes. The truncation of the 
dependent variable is therefore incidental and corresponds to one part of the sample. 
Non-random samples can arise from either exogenous sample selection or 
endogenous sample selection. When the sample selection is based on independent 
variables it is called exogenous and it does not cause any bias or inconsistency. When 
sample selection is based on explanatory variables it is called endogenous and bias 
always occurs. In the case of endogenous sample selection, further corrective action must 
be taken.  
The employees who leave DOD can possibly belong to two categories: 1) they 
might be low performers, and have a lower probability of being promoted; or 2) they 
might be high performers and thus be promoted faster, but are more capable compared to 
their peers and have more job prospects elsewhere. If the “leavers” are low performers, 
then all the results based on performance rating are probably upwardly biased; on the 
other hand, if the “leavers”’ are high performers, then we have the opposite effect. Since 
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sample selection is based on dependent variables, I need to account for selection bias. To 
do so I can use either the Heckman two-stage method to conduct a sample selection 
correction or the alternative method of the maximum-likelihood probit estimation with 
selection. 
The Heckman selection model [Heckman, 1979] assumes the existence of a 
regression relationship:  
                   Yj=Xj β+U1j regression equation                        (1)                               
However, the dependent variable is not always observed. It is observed for the j 
element if: 
S=1 [Z jγ+U 2j≥0]selection equation                                                         (2) 
where  
U 1~ N (0, σ) 
U 2~N (0, 1) 
Corr (U 1, U 2) = ρ 
When ρ ≠ 0, OLS techniques yield biased results and the two-stage Heckman 
procedure provides consistent, asymptotically efficient estimates for all the parameters in 
such models. The sample selection problem would not exist if ρ = 0. It is assumed that 
the elements of X and Z are always observed and written as: 
X β= β 0+ β 1Χ 1+…+β κ Χ κ and 
Z γ = γ0 + γ 1Ζ1+…+γm Zm 
Where Z is considered exogenous and written as: 
E (u/x, z) =0 
The equation of primary interest is the regression equation (equation 1). The 
second equation describes the selection process. It states that whether the value of Y for 
the person will be selected (observed) or not depends on a number of observable factors 
Z and a random term U that is assumed to be independent of Z. The factors Z should 
include the independent variables X of the regression equation and at least   one more 
variable (factor) that affects selection but does not affect Y. In other words, for the 
procedure to work well, Heckman requires that X be a strict subset of Z, any Xi is also an 
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element of Z, and we have no elements of Z that are not also in X. This has two 
implications: 1) any element that appears as an explanatory variable in the main 
regression equation should also be an explanatory variable in the selection equation2; and 
2) at least one element of Z does not belong in X. With the Heckman procedure we find 
βs as estimates of the entire sample. Since we deal with a subset of the sample, the extra 
factor/factors will act as proxy/proxies for all the unobserved variables that induce 
incidental truncation (sample selection). 
An alternative to the two-step Heckman procedure using OLS is to use Maximum 
Likelihood estimation. This method is nonlinear and involves the simultaneous 
estimation of both equations (regression and selection). According to [Wooldridge, 2003] 
it is more complicated, as it requires obtaining the joint distribution of Y and S and is best 
conducted after the two-step Heckman procedure if there is evidence of sample selection.  
The procedure fits maximum-likelihood probit models with sample selection and assumes 
that there exists an underlying relationship: 
 Y*j= X jβ+U1j               latent equation       (3) 
So that we only observe the binary outcome 
YProbit =(Y*>0)      Probit equation.                      (4) 
The dependent variable for observation j is observed if  
Yselectj = (ZJγ+ U 2j >0) selection equation                      (5) 
where  
U1~ N (0, 1) 
U2~N (0, 1) 
Corr (U1, U2) =ρ 
When ρ≠ 0, standard probit equations yield biased results. Briefly, the method is 
to estimate the selection equation by probit, where all exogenous variables   appear in the 
probit equation. Then the Inverse Mills Ratio3 acts as its own instrument, as it depends 
only on exogenous variables [Wooldridge, 2003]. 
                                                 
2According to Wooldridge (2003: “…in rare cases it makes sense to exclude elements from the 
selection equation, including all elements of x in z if not very costly”. 
3 Inverse Mills Ratio is term that can be added to a multiple regression model to remove sample 
selection bias. 
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B.  SELECTION CORRECTION TECHNIQUES 
I used the Heckman two-stage technique on the retention margin to account for 
selection in the OLS models and MLE to account for selection for the probit models. I 
assumed that workers’ decisions to stay or leave DOD are based on their mobility cost, 
that is, the cost of leaving. Expected returns are affected by the demographic 
characteristics and by employment opportunities. Retention rates will vary across 
occupational categories, while promotion rates should not be affected. Similarly, local 
labor market characteristics should affect the cost of leaving, but not affect promotion 
outcomes. Therefore, to identify the retention model I used occupation dummies and 
State dummies as identifying instruments. 
C.  RESULTS OF SALARY MODELS 
Two salary measures (Log of Annual_Compensation and Log of Hourly_ 
Compensation) were used as job performance indicators. All models were run in two 
separate steps and then corrected for selection on the retention margin. In the first step, 
the models were estimated without grade. In the second step, grade was added. All 
models were then corrected for selection using the Heckman two-step procedure. Results 
of the Annual_Compensation model are presented in Table 13 and the 
Hourly_Compensation model in Table 14. The retention models used in the Heckman 
correction procedures are presented in Appendix A. 
The overall significance of the salary models is explained by the coefficient of 
determination (R2), the proportion of the total variation in Y explained by the variation in 
the explanatory variables. In the salary models, the R2 indicates that 66.2% of the 
variation of the Log Compensation_03 Model and 65% of the variation of the Log 
Hourly_Compensation Model are explained by the variation of the explanatory variables. 
Other measures of goodness of fit (the overall significance of the models (F-value) and 
the significance of the individual coefficients) are also tested. The majority of the 
independent variables are statistically significant. The models have an F-value of 
589.27(Compensation_03 Model) and 565.72 (Hourly_Compensation Model) and a 
prob>F less than 0.0001. As a result, the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that all the 
coefficients of the independent variables are equal to zero and concludes that the models 
have explanatory power. In column 3 of Tables 13 and 14 the lambda term is significant 
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at 5% level for both models pointing to the existence of selection bias. The negative sign 
of lambda suggests that the unobserved factors predicting relations are negatively 
correlated with salary.     
 
Table 13. Log of Annual_Compensation Model (OLS) 





Female -0.2221 -0.0789 -0.0515 
 (0.0105)*** (0.0079)*** (0.0092)*** 
Black -0.0925 -0.0166 -0.0212 
 (0.0133)*** (0.0097)* (0.0109)* 
Hispanic -0.1023 -0.0340 -0.0693 
 (0.0197)*** (0.0142)** (0.0168)*** 
Other_Race -0.1128 -0.0203 -0.0477 
 (0.0166)*** (0.0120)* (0.0141)*** 
Veteran 0.0356 0.0214 -0.0150 
 (0.0153)** (0.0110)* (0.0131) 
Veter_Fed_Experience -0.0078 -0.0033 0.0005 
 (0.0018)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0015) 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95 -0.0041 -0.0121 -0.0205 
 (0.0024)* (0.0018)*** (0.0021)*** 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95sq 0.0006 0.0003 0.0006 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
Labor_Market_Experience_sq -13 E-06 0.0002 0.0004 
 (0.0001) (0.000036)*** (0.000044)*** 
Labor_Market_Experience -0.0030 -0.0165 -0.0240 
 (0.0016)* (0.0012)*** (0.0015)*** 
Other_Agent -0.1869 -0.0922 -0.0548 
 (0.0134)*** (0.0098)*** (0.0115)*** 
Navy 0.0548 0.0246 0.0355 
 (0.0129)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0107)*** 
USMC 0.0127 -0.0149 0.0032 
 (0.0326) (0.0235) (0.0268) 
USAF 0.0151 -0.0369 -0.0347 
 (0.0127) (0.0092)*** (0.0105)*** 
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Bachelor_Degree 0.3147 0.1178 0.0919 
 (0.0119)*** (0.0090)*** (0.0106)*** 
MA_MS95 0.3803 0.0638 0.0475 
 (0.0173)*** (0.0132)*** (0.0154)*** 
PhD95 0.5649 0.0583 0.0957 
 (0.0380)*** (0.0283)** (0.0322)*** 
Education_Change 0.0517 0.0201 0.0086 
 (0.0047)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0041)** 
Grade  0.0938 0.0880 
  (0.0013)*** (0.0016)*** 
Constant 10.7668 10.2469 10.5773 
 (0.0169)*** (0.0142)*** (0.0351)*** 
Observations 5718 5718 13512 
F  172.47 589.27  
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000  
R-squared 0.35 0.66  
Lambda   -0.258 
   (0.024)** 
ρ(rho)   -0.80 
                   *** Significant at 0.01   level ** Significant at 0.05 level* Significant at 0.1 level 
                          Standard errors in parenthesis 
 








Female -0.1896 -0.0465 -0.0230 
 (0.0103)*** (0.0076)*** (0.0087)*** 
Black -0.0898 -0.0155 -0.0194 
 (0.0131)*** (0.0094) (0.0104)* 
Hispanic -0.1015 -0.0348 -0.0648 
 (0.0193)*** (0.0138)** (0.0158)*** 
Other_Race -0.1120 -0.0224 -0.0454 
 (0.0163)*** (0.0117)* (0.0133)*** 
Veteran 0.0171 0.0035 -0.0278 
 (0.0150) (0.0107) (0.0124)** 
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Veter_Fed_Experience -0.0067 -0.0023 0.0010 
 (0.0017)*** (0.0013)* (0.0014) 
Total_Federal_Service_ 
Years_95 
-0.0062 -0.0145 -0.0217 
 (0.0024)*** (0.0017)*** (0.0020)*** 
Total_Federal_Service_ 
Years_95sq 
0.0006 0.0004 0.0006 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
Labor_Market_Experience_sq -0.000013 0.0002 0.0004 
 (0.000049) (0.000035)*** (0.000042)*** 
Labor_Market_Experience -0.0014 -0.0148 -0.0212 
 (0.0016) (0.0011)*** (0.0014)*** 
Other_Agent -0.1229 -0.0306 0.0016 
 (0.0132)*** (0.0095)*** (0.0109) 
Navy 0.0394 0.0087 0.0175 
 (0.0127)*** (0.0091) (0.0101)* 
USMC -0.0142 -0.0420 -0.0264 
 (0.0320) (0.0229)* (0.0254) 
USAF 0.0015 -0.0509 -0.0495 
 (0.0124) (0.0089)*** (0.0099)*** 
Bachelor_Degree 0.3253 0.1317 0.1101 
 (0.0117)*** (0.0088)*** (0.0100)*** 
MA_MS95 0.3938 0.0795 0.0657 
 (0.0170)*** (0.0129)*** (0.0145)*** 
PhD95 0.5828 0.0781 0.1102 
 (0.0374)*** (0.0276)*** (0.0306)*** 
Education_Change 0.0535 0.0224 0.0127 
 (0.0046)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0039)*** 
Grade  0.0929 0.0880 
  (0.0013)*** (0.0015)*** 
Constant 3.1005 2.5880 2.8686 
 (0.0166)*** (0.0138)*** (0.0330)*** 
Observations 5691 5691 13485 
F  151.19 565.72  
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000  
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R-squared 0.32 0.65  
Lambda   -0.21 
   (0.022)** 
ρ(rho)   -0.74 
    *** Significant at 0.01 level ** Significant at 0.05 level * Significant at 0.1level 
        Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
Most of the explanatory variables have the expected signs and are significant at 
the 1% level. The first column (Model 1) of Table 13 indicates that females are paid 
22.21% less than males, minorities are paid less than their white peers (black -9.25%, 
Hispanic -10.23%, other races -11.28%), and that veterans receive higher annual 
compensation (+3.56%) than non-veterans. Prior federal and non-federal experiences 
both have a negative effect on annual salary and are significant at the 10% level. When 
“Grade” is added in model 2, females receive 7.8% less annual compensation, minorities 
still get paid less (black -1.6%, Hispanic -3.4%, and other races 2.03%); veterans are paid 
2.14% more, and federal experience and non-federal experience become significant at the 
1% level. For an employee with ten years of prior federal experience, one additional year 
of prior federal experience reduces annual compensation by 0.61% (-
0.0121+(2*0.0003)*10) while for an employee with ten years of non-federal experience 
one additional year of non-federal experience reduces annual compensation by 1.25% (-
0.0165+(2*0.0002)*10), all else remaining the same. All education variables are 
significant: a Bachelor’s degree increases annual compensation by 11.7%, a Master’s 
degree by 6.3% and a PhD by 5.8%. The third column “Heckman model” of Table 13 
presents the results after accounting for selection bias. After the selection correction, 
females are still paid less than men (-5.15%), minorities are paid less than whites (black -
2.12%, Hispanic -6.93%, other race -4.77%), and labor market experience and prior 
federal experience have a negative effect on annual compensation. Graduate and 
postgraduate education increase annual salary by 9.19% for a Bachelor’s, 4.75% for a 
Master’s and 9.57% for a PhD. 
The “Hourly_Compensation Log Model” in Table 14 indicates that being female 
or belonging to a minority group has a negative effect on hourly compensation. On an 
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hourly basis, and after selection correction (in column 3), females are paid 2.3% less than 
males. Blacks are paid 1.94% less, Hispanics 6.48% less and members of “other” 
minorities 4.54% less than whites. Veterans get 2.78% less than non-veterans. When 
employees have ten years of federal or non-federal experience one additional year of  
prior federal and non-federal experience reduce hourly salary by 0.97%4 and 1.32%5, 
respectively. A Bachelor’s degree increases annual earnings by 11.01%, a Master’s 
degree by 6.57%, and a PhD by 11.02%. 
The salary model results are consistent with other study results mentioned in 
Chapter II. Like Asch (2000) and Dunson (1985), the results indicate that more-educated 
employees are paid more than less-educated employees. 
D. RESULTS OF PERFORMANCE MODELS 
Three performance measures (Average_Rating, ONETOP, and 
High_Performance) were used to estimate job productivity. All models were estimated in 
two separate specifications and then corrected for selection on the retention margin. The 
Heckman two-step technique was used for the Average_Rating Model and probit 
maximum likelihood estimation methods (MLE) were used for the ONETOP and 
High_Performance models. Partial effects for the probit models were then calculated. 
Results are presented in Tables 15, 16, 17. Table 18 shows the partial effects6 of the 
probit performance models. Since the Heckman model of the ONETOP probit model is 
insignificant (Prob>Chi2=0.79), model (2) of Table 16 was used to calculate partial 
effects. For the High-performance probit model, the Heckman model of Table 17 was 
used (Prob>Chi2=0.04). 




                                                 
4 -0.0217+(2*(0.0006)*10)=-0.0097=-0.97% 
5 -0.0212+(2*(0.0004)*10)=-0.0132=-1.32% 
6 Partial Effect is the effect of an explanatory variable on the dependent variable, holding other factors 
in the regression model fixed. 
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Female 0.0354 0.0831 0.0798 
 (0.0153)** (0.0157)*** (0.0163)*** 
Black -0.0525 -0.0264 -0.0259 
 (0.0194)*** (0.0193) (0.0193) 
Hispanic -0.0172 0.0059 0.0100 
 (0.0286) (0.0283) (0.0289) 
Other_Race -0.1079 -0.0763 -0.0731 
 (0.0241)*** (0.0240)*** (0.0244)*** 
Veteran 0.0634 0.0597 0.0638 
 (0.0223)*** (0.0220)*** (0.0227)*** 
Veter_Fed_Experience -0.0071 -0.0058 -0.0063 
 (0.0026)*** (0.0026)** (0.0026)** 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95 0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0003 
 (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0038) 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95sq 0.0001 -0.0000053 -0.00000673 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Labor_Market_Experience_sq 0.0077 0.0031 0.0040 
 (0.0023)*** (0.0023) (0.0027) 
Labor_Market_Experience -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0001)* (0.0001)* 
Other_Agent -0.6475 -0.6155 -0.6201 
 (0.0195)*** (0.0195)*** (0.0205)*** 
Navy -0.7990 -0.8084 -0.8098 
 (0.0188)*** (0.0186)*** (0.0187)*** 
USMC -0.7595 -0.7669 -0.7692 
 (0.0474)*** (0.0469)*** (0.0469)*** 
USAF -0.7303 -0.7560 -0.7553 
 (0.0175)*** (0.0175)*** (0.0175)*** 
Bachelor_Degree 0.0139 -0.0472 -0.0445 
 (0.0173) (0.0178)*** (0.0182)** 
MA_MS95 0.0751 -0.0246 -0.0232 
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 (0.0251)*** (0.0261) (0.0262) 
PhD95 0.1200 -0.0420 -0.0470 
 (0.0553)** (0.0563) (0.0566) 
Grade  0.0307 0.0314 
  (0.0026)*** (0.0028)*** 
Constant 4.5795 4.4077 4.3684 
 (0.0247)*** (0.0283)*** (0.0611)*** 
Observations 5708 5708 13508 
F  177.91 180.13  
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000  
R-squared 0.35 0.36  
Lambda   0.030 
   (0.042)** 
Ρ (rho)   0.061 
 *** Significant at 0.01 level ** Significant at 0.05 level * Significant at 0.1level 
        Standard errors in parenthesis 
 








Female 0.1183 0.2686 0.2634 
 (0.0478)** (0.0507)*** (0.0549)*** 
Black -0.1506 -0.0889 -0.0884 
 (0.0606)** (0.0614) (0.0614) 
Hispanic -0.1442 -0.0947 -0.0883 
 (0.0883) (0.0889) (0.0924) 
Other_Race -0.2411 -0.1566 -0.1516 
 (0.0705)*** (0.0716)** (0.0743)** 
Veteran 0.2985 0.2900 0.2961 
 (0.0708)*** (0.0721)*** (0.0757)*** 
Veter_Fed_Experience -0.0299 -0.0254 -0.0261 
 (0.0080)*** (0.0081)*** (0.0085)*** 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95 0.0052 -0.0033 -0.0018 
 (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0125) 
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Total_Federal_Service_Years_95sq 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0001 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Labor_Market_Experience_sq 0.0047 -0.0081 -0.0067 
 (0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0092) 
Labor_Market_Experience -0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Other_Agent -1.1125 -1.0439 -1.0503 
 (0.0613)*** (0.0623)*** (0.0662)*** 
Navy -0.8530 -0.8932 -0.8948 
 (0.0612)*** (0.0622)*** (0.0623)*** 
USMC -0.8756 -0.9190 -0.9220 
 (0.1352)*** (0.1366)*** (0.1368)*** 
USAF -0.8957 -0.9924 -0.9908 
 (0.0580)*** (0.0597)*** (0.0603)*** 
Bachelor_Degree -0.0014 -0.1926 -0.1876 
 (0.0538) (0.0573)*** (0.0607)*** 
MA_MS95 0.1319 -0.1805 -0.1773 
 (0.0809) (0.0868)** (0.0877)** 
PhD95 0.6674 0.1803 0.1731 
 (0.2509)*** (0.2578) (0.2593) 
Grade  0.0911 0.0922 
  (0.0085)*** (0.0094)*** 
Constant 1.4863 1.0096 0.8068 
 (0.0807)*** (0.0916)*** (0.04)*** 
Observations 5708 5708 13502 
R-squared 0.09 0.11  
Chi-square   620.84  
Pr>Chi2  <0.0001  
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-2Log L  4698.101  
ρ(rho)   0.046 
Prob>Chi2   0.79 
 *** Significant at 0.01 level** Significant at 0.05 level * Significant at 0.1level 
        Standard errors in parenthesis 
 








Female 0.0732 0.1696 0.1077 
 (0.0490) (0.0506)*** (0.0497)** 
Black -0.0888 -0.0249 -0.0835 
 (0.0608) (0.0616) (0.0591) 
Hispanic -0.0039 0.0576 -0.0450 
 (0.0895) (0.0905) (0.0891) 
Other_Race -0.2072 -0.1454 -0.2295 
 (0.0842)** (0.0851)* (0.0818)*** 
Veteran 0.2985 0.2558 0.2112 
 (0.0658)*** (0.0664)*** (0.0794)*** 
Veter_Fed_Experience -0.0343 -0.0302 -0.0267 
 (0.0082)*** (0.0082)*** (0.0090)*** 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95 0.0146 0.0150 0.0043 
 (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0119) 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95sq 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0005 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Labor_Market_Experience_sq -1.2466 -1.2182  
 (0.0631)*** (0.0643)***  
Labor_Market_Experience -2.0143 -2.0607  
 (0.0956)*** (0.0965)***  
Other_Agent -1.9052 -1.9341 -1.1416 
 (0.2474)*** (0.2450)*** (0.0951)*** 
Navy -1.6335 -1.7205 -1.9177 
 (0.0669)*** (0.0689)*** (0.1248)*** 
USMC 0.1088 -0.0040 -1.7988 
 (0.0541)** (0.0560) (0.2519)*** 
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USAF 0.2099 -0.0047 -1.5875 
 (0.0787)*** (0.0832) (0.0827)*** 
Bachelor_Degree 0.4009 0.0297 0.0753 
 (0.1612)** (0.1684) (0.0553) 
MA_MS95  0.0694 0.1677 
  (0.0083)*** (0.0798)** 
PhD95 -0.2325 -0.7211 0.3915 
 (0.0561)*** (0.0811)*** (0.1569)** 
Grade 0.0732 0.1696  
 (0.0490) (0.0506)***  
Constant -0.0888 -0.0249 0.0986 
 (0.0608) (0.0616) (0.1644) 
Observations 5708 5708 13502 
R-squared 0.26 0.26  
Chi-square   1673.5810  
Pr>Chi2  <0.0001  
-2Log L  4352.315  
ρ(rho)   -0.33 
Prob>Chi2   0.04 
*** Significant at 0.01 level ** Significant at 0.05 level * Significant at 0.1l 
       Standard errors in parenthesis 
  
Table 18. Partial Effects of Probit Performance Models 
Variables Models 
 ONETOP High_Performance 
Female 0.05962*** 0.03264** 
Black -0.02073 -0.0247 
Hispanic -0.02233 -0.0134 
Other_Race -0.03780** -0.0644*** 
Veteran 0.06158*** 0.06641*** 
Veter_Fed_Experience -0.0057*** -0.0080*** 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95 -0.00075 0.00130 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95sq -4.69E-07 0.00014 
Labor_Market_Experience -0.0018  
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Labor_Market_Experience_sq 1.95734E-05  
Other_Agent -0.3143*** -0.2606*** 
Navy -0.2585*** -0.3376*** 
USMC -0.2948*** -0.2345* 
USAF -0.2840*** -0.3127 
Bachelor_Degree -0.0459*** 0.02322 
MA_MS95 -0.044** 0.05348* 
PhD95  0.0369 0.13360 
Grade 0.02054***  
*** Significant at 0.01 level ** Significant at 0.05 level * Significant at 0.1level   
       Source of ONETOP probit model: Column 2 of Table 16 
       Source of High_Performance probit model: Column 3 of Table 17 
     
The goodness-of-fit in the probit models can be examined with the -2 log L value. 
Very similar to the F value used in OLS, -2 log L value tests the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients are zero. The overall significance of every one of the performance models is 
less than 0.001 (p<0.0001). As a result, I reject the null hypothesis and conclude that all 
the models have explanatory power.  
No selection bias problem was identified through Heckman’s procedures in the 
ONETOP Model. The lambda term of the Heckman correction for the Average_Rating 
Model is significant at the 5% level. The results indicated that females perform better 
than men. After controlling for education and grade, females receive 0.079 higher 
average rating on a 5-level rating scale (Average_Rating Model). Also, the predicted 
probability of receiving one outstanding rating is 0.059 (on a scale 0-1) greater than that 
of men (ONETOP Model), and the predicted probability to be a high performer is 0.032 
(on a scale 0-1) higher than for men (High_Performance Model)7. Furthermore, 
considering only the significant variables, the models indicate that “other” races (non-
black, non-Hispanic) perform worse than whites. In most cases, experience (prior federal 
and non-federal) is insignificant. The results for the education variables are inconsistent. 
                                                 
7Logistic regression models the log of the odds (Pi / (1- Pi), of the event Yi =1, where Pi is the 
probability that Yi =1. The intercept of a logistic regression gives the log odds of Yi   =1 for the case where 
all predictor variables are at their base line. We predict the probability by predicting the logia and then 
transforming back to a probability based on the formula:  Pi= 1/ (1+exp (- (β0  +βι))), β0= intercept, βι=the 
coefficient of Xi variable. 
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A Bachelor’s degree reduces worker’s average rating by 0.044 (on a scale 0-5), and 
reduces the predicted probability of receiving ONETOP rating by 0.0459 (on a scale 0-1), 
while a Master’s degree reduces the predicted probability of receiving ONETOP rating 
by 0.044. 
The results are consistent with those of earlier studies mentioned in Chapter II. 
Similar to the results in Mehay and Pema (2004), females receive higher ratings than men 
and performance does not seem to be positively correlated to human capital [Dunson, 
1985]. The majority of the education variables are insignificant, some have positive signs 
whereas some have negative ones. The fact that education variables do not seem to have a 
uniform effect on performance opposes the general belief that education improves 
employees’ job fit and as a result their performance. It could be also be the case, as 
suggested by Usan and Utoglu ( 1999), that subjective performance ratings may be a 
weak way to measure actual productivity. 
E. RESULTS OF PROMOTION MODELS 
Three promotion models (Supervisor_Promotion, Promotion_03 and Num_Of_ 
Promotions) were estimated in two separate steps and then corrected for selection on the 
retention margin. In the first step, the Num_Of_Promotions and Promotion_03 models 
were estimated while omitting grade, while the Supervisor_Promotion model was 
estimated without average rating. In the second step, grade and average rating variables 
were added. In the third and final step, I conducted Heckman corrections and found that 
all models needed to be corrected for selection, since the ‘lambda’ term is significant at 
the 1% level for the Num_Of_Promotions Model, and the rho term is significant in the  
Supervisor_Promotion and Promotion_03 models. Results are presented in Tables 19, 20, 
and 21. Table 22 shows the partial effect of the promotion probit models. The retention 
models used in the Heckman corrections are presented in Appendix A. 
The coefficients of female and minority variables (where significant) are negative, 
as expected. Females receive 0.20 fewer promotions than males (on a 0-8 scale). The 
predicted probability of receiving at least one promotion during the period 1995-2003 
(Promotion_03 model) is 0.018 lower for females than for men. Like females, minorities  
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(black, Hispanic, and other race) are promoted less. Compared to whites, the predicted 
probability for a Hispanic to become a supervisor is 0.0776 less and, for the other races, 
0.068 less, all else remaining constant . 
All else being the same, having a Bachelor’s degree increases the total number of 
promotions during this period by 0.93 (1-8 scale), and the predicted probability of 
receiving at least one promotion during the 1995-1003 period by 0.024. Having a 
Master’s degree increases the total number of promotions by 0.49. Finally, a Ph.D. 
increases the total number of promotions by 0.51 and the predicted probability of 
becoming a supervisor by 0.0691.  









Female -0.0863 -0.2605 -0.1225 
 (0.0448)* (0.0476)*** (0.0369)*** 
Black -0.0762 -0.1582 -0.1111 
 (0.0558) (0.0567)*** (0.0437)** 
Hispanic -0.1613 -0.2360 -0.2744 
 (0.0810)** (0.0822)*** (0.0652)*** 
Other_Race -0.0848 -0.1831 -0.2224 
 (0.0687) (0.0701)*** (0.0553)*** 
Veteran 0.2786 0.2760 -0.0166 
 (0.0627)*** (0.0633)*** (0.0498) 
Veter_Fed_Experience -0.0312 -0.0341 -0.0071 
 (0.0071)*** (0.0072)*** (0.0056) 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95 -0.0432 -0.0399 -0.0504 
 (0.0101)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0078)*** 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95sq 0.0005 0.0008 0.0013 
 (0.0005) (0.0005)* (0.0004)*** 
Labor_Market_Experience_sq -0.0740 -0.0646 -0.0451 
 (0.0072)*** (0.0074)*** (0.0055)*** 
Labor_Market_Experience 0.0010 0.0008 0.0006 
 (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** 
Other_Agent 0.0070 -0.0365 0.0810 
 (0.0593) (0.0598) (0.0448)* 
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Navy 0.1210 0.1760 0.1706 
 (0.0562)** (0.0573)*** (0.0449)*** 
USMC -0.0598 0.0012 0.0168 
 (0.1323) (0.1356) (0.1043) 
USAF -0.0322 0.0728 0.0198 
 (0.0510) (0.0523) (0.0416) 
Avg_Performance96_98 0.0919 0.1818 0.1381 
 (0.0311)*** (0.0323)*** (0.0225)*** 
Bachelor_Degree 0.0670 0.2615 0.1774 
 (0.0522) (0.0556)*** (0.0443)*** 
MA_MS95 -0.1937 0.1024 0.0554 
 (0.0714)*** (0.0767) (0.0610) 
PhD95 -0.6366 -0.1866 0.0408 
 (0.1453)*** (0.1511) (0.1121) 
Grade  -0.0927 -0.0837 
  (0.0077)*** (0.0058)*** 
Constant 1.2497 1.4453 1.9396 
 (0.1607)*** (0.1640)*** (0.1178)*** 
Observations 5537 5537 13331 
ρ(rho)   -0.97 
   Prob>chi2=0 
*** Significant at 0.01 level ** Significant at 0.05 level * Significant at 0.1level 
       Standard errors in parenthesis 
 









Female -0.3453 -0.3488 0.0261 
 (0.0470)*** (0.0473)*** (0.0323) 
Black -0.0953 -0.0756 -0.0006 
 (0.0613) (0.0618) (0.0385) 
Hispanic -0.0619 -0.0578 -0.1951 
 (0.0885) (0.0890) (0.0604)*** 
Other_Race -0.2497 -0.2082 -0.1722 
 (0.0786)*** (0.0791)*** (0.0501)*** 
Veteran 0.2254 0.2139 -0.0338 
 (0.0647)*** (0.0651)*** (0.0453) 
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Veter_Fed_Experience -0.0212 -0.0190 0.0089 
 (0.0075)*** (0.0076)** (0.0052)* 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95 0.0217 0.0213 -0.0233 
 (0.0106)** (0.0107)** (0.0069)*** 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95sq 0.0001 0.0001 0.0008 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003)*** 
Labor_Market_Experience_sq 0.0291 0.0274 -0.0247 
 (0.0074)*** (0.0074)*** (0.0047)*** 
Labor_Market_Experience -0.0008 -0.0007 0.0006 
 (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0001)*** 
Other_Agent 0.0420 0.2258 0.3053 
 (0.0621) (0.0674)*** (0.0418)*** 
Navy 0.1029 0.3531 0.2906 
 (0.0577)* (0.0671)*** (0.0415)*** 
USMC 0.5375 0.7817 0.5008 
 (0.1276)*** (0.1319)*** (0.0942)*** 
USAF 0.4087 0.6346 0.3209 
 (0.0510)*** (0.0600)*** (0.0409)*** 
Bachelor_Degree 0.2135 0.2158 -0.0039 
 (0.0513)*** (0.0517)*** (0.0350) 
A_MS95 0.2997 0.2804 0.0232 
 (0.0706)*** (0.0710)*** (0.0510) 
PhD95 0.1597 0.1280 0.1752 
 (0.1608) (0.1614) (0.1053)* 
Average_Rating  0.3142 0.1854 
  (0.0418)*** (0.0253)*** 
Constant -1.3082 -2.7643 -0.7048 
 (0.0775)*** (0.2107)*** (0.1328)*** 
Observations 5731 5708 10261 
ρ(rho)   -0.98 
   Prob>chi2=0.00 
 *** Significant at 0.01 level ** Significant at 0.05 level * Significant at 0.1level 

















Female -0.1018 -0.2674 -0.2032 
 (0.0443)** (0.0470)*** (0.0781)*** 
Black -0.0703 -0.1468 -0.2712 
 (0.0552) (0.0560)*** (0.0875)*** 
Hispanic -0.1656 -0.2356 -0.6077 
 (0.0802)** (0.0813)*** (0.1367)*** 
Other_Race -0.0519 -0.1434 -0.5371 
 (0.0685) (0.0699)** (0.1125)*** 
Veteran 0.2754 0.2726 0.2014 
 (0.0623)*** (0.0629)*** (0.1031)* 
Veter_Fed_Experience -0.0294 -0.0321 -0.0125 
 (0.0071)*** (0.0072)*** (0.0121) 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95 -0.0422 -0.0390 -0.1717 
 (0.0101)*** (0.0102)*** (0.0167)*** 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95sq 0.0005 0.0008 0.0040 
 (0.0005) (0.0005)* (0.0007)*** 
Labor_Market_Experience_sq -0.0692 -0.0597 -0.2111 
 (0.0071)*** (0.0072)*** (0.0124)*** 
Labor_Market_Experience 0.0009 0.0007 0.0039 
 (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0004)*** 
Other_Agent -0.0095 -0.0511 -0.1927 
 (0.0586) (0.0591) (0.0936)** 
Navy 0.1261 0.1778 0.3569 
 (0.0557)** (0.0567)*** (0.0862)*** 
USMC -0.0339 0.0248 0.3736 
 (0.1319) (0.1350) (0.2126)* 
USAF -0.0255 0.0744 0.1490 
 (0.0505) (0.0518) (0.0823)* 
Avg_Performance96_98 0.0944 0.1795 0.0884 
 (0.0307)*** (0.0319)*** (0.0559) 
Bachelor_Degree 0.0822 0.2676 0.9313 
 (0.0516) (0.0549)*** (0.0829)*** 
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MA_MS95 -0.1889 0.0943 0.4966 
 (0.0708)*** (0.0760) (0.1211)*** 
PhD95 -0.6716 -0.2411 0.5132 
 (0.1445)*** (0.1503) (0.2591)** 
Grade  -0.0885 -0.3187 
  (0.0076)*** (0.0127)*** 
Constant 1.1569 1.3390 7.8827 
 (0.1585)*** (0.1615)*** (0.4393)*** 
Observations 5537 5537 10023 
λ   2.28*** 
ρ(rho)   -0.90 
*** Significant at 0.01 level ** Significant at 0.05 level * Significant at 0.1level 
       Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
Table 22. Partial Effects of Probit Promotion Models 
Variables Models 
 Promotion_03 Supervisor_Promotion 
Female -0.01827*** 0.01038 
Black -0.01749** -0.00022 
Hispanic -0.04844*** -0.07765*** 
Other_Race -0.0377*** -0.06860*** 
Veteran -0.00249 -0.01346 
Veter_Fed_ Experience_95 -0.0010 0.0035* 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95  -0.752** -0.0092*** 
Total_Federal_Service_Years_95sq  0.00019*** 0.00032*** 
Labor_Market_Experience -0.006738*** -0.0098*** 
Labor_Market_Experience_SQ 0.000093*** 0.00025*** 
Other_Agent 0.01171* 0.1199*** 
Navy 0.02361*** 0.1143*** 
USMC 0.0024 0.1894*** 
USAF 0.00292 0.1260*** 
Avg_Performance96_98 0.02061***  
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Bachelor_Degree 0.02458*** -0.0015 
MA_MS95 0.00799 0.0092 
PhD95  0.0059 0.06913* 
Average_Rating  0.07384*** 
Grade -0.01249***  
*** Significant at 0.01 level ** Significant at 0.05 level * Significant at 0.1level   
       Source of Promotion_03 probit model: Column 3 of Table 21 
       Source of Supervisor_Promotion probit model: Column 3 of Table 22 
 
At first glance, the models reveal different results for females, minorities and 
veterans when compared to males, whites and non-veterans. The results suggest that 
females receive lower annual and hourly compensation and are less likely to be promoted 
than men, even though they are better performers. The results also suggest that minorities 
are paid less and are less likely to be promoted. Veterans, on the other hand, are paid 
more, perform better, receive more promotions and are more likely to become 
supervisors. More educated employees are paid more and are promoted faster, but are not 
necessarily better performers. The models also confirmed that performance rating is a 
weak way to measure productivity. 
Females produce different results than males, as is the case with minorities vs. 
whites and veterans opposed to non-veterans. The question is: are these differences 
created inside the civil service or are they due to differences in the characteristics of the 
population hired in 1995?  Based on the information presented in Table 6, the average 
entry grade for females in 1995 is 5.98, while for males it is 8.18. Furthermore, the 
average promotion increase presented in Table 7 indicates that employees hired at lower 
grades have a higher progression when compared to their peers hired in higher grades. On 
average, an employee hired in 1995 in grade 5 had received 3.08 promotions by 2003, or 
an increase of 62% in grade level. Similarly, an employee hired in grade 7 in 1995 
received 4.27 promotions by 2003, or an increase of 61% in grade level. The lower the 
employees’ entry grades, the higher the percentage grade level increase they received by 




Graph 1. Grade Increase by Entry Grade 


















 With regard to entry grade, males and females, and also minorities and veterans, 
follow different career paths, and are placed on different steps in the job ladder in the 
organizations hierarchical structure. Each one of these groups has a different promotion 
speed, due to the fact that job progression is partly determined by vacancy rates. As 
workers progress to upper grades, vacancies are reduced and job requirements change. 
Consequently, promotions, compensation, and average rating do not clearly depend on 
workers’ performance or gender and race, as indicated by the models mentioned above. 
The extent to which promotions and average rating are dependent on employee 





















































V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis explores the key factors that affect job performance and career 
progression of DOD civilian workers hired in 1995 who stayed in civil service until 2003. 
The thesis helps decision makers understand factors that are related to employee 
productivity, and what must be done to improve resource utilization. 
Federal employees are subject to periodic evaluations based on objective, job-
related criteria. The evaluations use performance standards for each job level, which the 
employees must fulfill to get a promotion. A five-level appraisal system is used, based on 
Performance Management Regulations. The DOD promotion system is based on merit 
and promotes employees according to a position’s qualifications, the time-in-grade 
requirements, the time-after-competitive-appointment restriction, and the requirements 
for “fully successful” performance. 
To determine the factors that affect performance and promotion, I used three 
proxy performance measures: compensation, promotion, and annual performance ratings. 
OLS and probit models were estimated to gauge the effect of gender, race, experience (a 
proxy for age), education and grade on employee productivity. In particular, as 
compensation (salary) models I used the log of annual compensation and the log of 
hourly compensation. As promotion measures I specified models of: number of 
promotions, at least one promotion, and promotion to supervisor. To describe 
performance I formed three models: High_Performance, Average_Rating, and ONETOP.    
The results, which are generally consistent with previous studies, were then corrected for 
selection on the retention margin.  
The thesis provides insight into how people belonging to different races and 
gender perform, how they advance in the hierarchical ladder and how education and 
grade influence the final outcome. In general, females (although they perform better) and 
minorities are paid less and advance at lower rates compared to men and non-minority 
groups. In contrast, veterans receive higher salaries, receive more promotions and have a 
higher predicted probability of getting at least one promotion. Consistent with previous 
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studies, the education coefficients indicate that an employee’s rated performance does not 
seem to be correlated with human capital. However, more highly educated employees are 
paid more and promoted faster than their less-educated co-workers. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The multivariable models used in this thesis revealed that personnel productivity 
varies across the DOD workforce. Females in particular receive 1.6% higher annual 
ratings than men, have a 4.7% higher probability of receiving top rating and a 2.6% 
higher probability of being classified as a high performer. Personnel performance and 
productivity appear to strongly relate to the grade of entry. Women join DOD at a lower 
grade, on average, than men. The responsibilities are minor and the challenges are fewer 
in these grades. Possibly as a result, women get better ratings. This thesis also suggests 
that annual performance appraisals are a weak way to measure productivity. It would be 
useful to evaluate personnel productivity based on team productivity. In other words, it 
would be interesting to determine how teams perform and whether team performances 
match the individual’s productivity. Do teams consisting of low-productive workers lose 
their targets? If not, then how can workers’ ratings be explained?  
The reason I used three different indicators of performance is that there is no 
standardized performance measure. Each employer and employee understands that 
concept differently, and the correct output indicator will differ across types of agencies. 
In DOD, performance is based on periodic evaluations of what workers accomplish. The 
results suggest that performance evaluations might not be accurate indexes of actual 
productivity. Although females perform better, they are promoted and paid less than men. 
The differences are not big, but tell us that the current DOD promotion and evaluation 
system must be improved or changed to match individual productivity differences. One 
way to improve the performance management system is to improve the data used. 
Additional information like self-assessment evaluations, peer assessments, and personal 
data (e.g., unexcused absenteeism) would be useful. A more accurate system will increase 
motivation and satisfaction among workers, help develop a strong commitment to DOD 
and, when the related data is used by researchers, will lead to more precise results. 
Additionally, a more accurate system that is based directly on criteria dependent on 
employees’ actions will increase productivity and provide a sense of fairness. 
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Although females and minorities perform better, they receive fewer promotions 
than men (and whites) and were less likely to receive at least one promotion during the 
period 1995-2003. Promotions must be based on how well the workers perform at their 
current job. Promotions in DOD depend on the availability of job vacancies to which one 
can be promoted, skills of other employees, seniority, merit and, partly, on performance. 
To increase worker satisfaction and motivation, and to promote the right people to the 
right places, we must lessen the impact of position availability on promotion and must 
increase the role of performance and work experience. My personal opinion is that a two-
speed promotion system could be implemented. Each promotion speed category will have 
different promotion rates. The more skilled employees will belong to the promotion 
speed with the higher promotion rate and will be able to advance to the highest levels of 
the hierarchical ladder. Others will experience a lower promotion speed and will be 
limited to promotions of a certain grade. The two-speed promotion system will result in 
increased motivation and productivity, since workers realize they must be capable to 
belong in the preferential category. 
Performance model results suggest that signs of the education variables vary and 
most are insignificant, implying that more-educated people are not necessarily better 
performers. It is generally believed that education (training) improves job fit. As a result, 
I would expect that performance would be positively correlated with education.  Not 
having a clear relationship between education and performance indicates that it is 
necessary for DOD to conduct an organization and education needs analysis that will 
provide information on whether additional education is required.  Furthermore, the 
analysis would show what degrees and training are needed, determine the ‘when’ and the 
‘who’ for these training and educational needs, and determine whether or not 
managers/supervisors support the implementation of the education plan. It is very 
important that the post-training period be examined for the trainees to assess if they 
effectively apply the knowledge, skills, and attitudes gained in training to their job. Also, 
one needs to examine to what extent the job environment provides opportunities for the 
trainees to apply what they learned. It is very possible that DOD overemphasizes the 
acquisition of skills and places too little weight on what happens in the work environment 
after training. 
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Based on the model results, there are performance, promotion and compensation 
differences between race/ethnic groups, and between veterans and non-veterans. DOD as 
an organization is structured in teams/working units where individuals interact to 
accomplish desired outcomes.  To increase productivity and resource utilization, DOD 
must promote diversity inside its working teams [Triantis, 1975], diversity based on what 
team members know and how experienced they are and diversity based on more 
fundamental differences like gender and race. By eliminating differences in treatment 
among co-workers and by applying common cultural values, DOD will be able to reduce 
employee barriers regarding stereotypes, values and work practices that constrain their 
contribution and delay their development. However, diversity has a price. Interpersonal 
communication becomes more difficult. As a result, in order to form diverse groups DOD 
must train its personnel to view the actions and thoughts of the member of the other 
groups as functional and reasonable to produce a sense of cohesion.   
As a final recommendation, I want to mention the change of the pay system in 
DOD. Until recently, salary has been based on the grade the employee attains, adjusted 
for locality. The pay system must make a clear distinction in the future by paying jobs, 
not individuals. The job itself must determine the level of compensation, not the people in 
them. The new pay system must reward effort, skills, responsibility and working 
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Black 0.0223 0.0236 0.0048 0.0052 -0.0080 0.0012 -0.0131 0.0296 
 (0.0330) (0.0331) (0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0327) (0.032) (0.0363) (0.0381) 


































































































-0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0013 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
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USAF -0.0508 -0.0474 0.0147 0.0164 0.0947 -0.2380 -0.1200 -0.0025 










- - - - - - - 0.1991 













(0.0963) (0.0324) (0.0349) (0.0386) 









- (0.0481) (0.0518) (0.0568) 
PhD95 -0.1069 -0.1085 -0.0669 -0.0889 -0.4398 -0.0954 -0.1472 -0.2589 
65






- - - - - - -0.0749 - 










- - - - - - 











Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




















13512 13485 13502 13502 13502 13331 10261 10023 
*** Significant at 0.01 level ** Significant at 0.05 level * Significant at 0.1le 
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